Arabica by NCCAR - March 2026

Rania Hamdan
Tue, 31 Mar 2026 22:46:00 -0400

Welcome to the March 2026 edition of Arabica by NCCAR, highlighting community initiatives, organizational updates, and analysis on key regional developments.

Community Highlights
NCCAR Community Iftar & Fundraiser: A Successful Evening of Mobilization and Solidarity

The NCCAR Community Iftar & Fundraiser, held on Monday March 16, as part of our Dardachat Series, brought together community leaders, members, and partners for an evening dedicated to mobilization, knowledge sharing, networking, and fundraising. The event successfully gathered key actors from across our community, creating a meaningful space for dialogue, collaboration, and collective action in response to the current challenges facing the MENA region.

The evening served not only as an opportunity to connect and reflect, but also to raise funds for organizations working directly on the ground. We were proud to support initiatives including Sadr Foundation Canada, The Eternal Companion, and Momken, whose efforts provide essential humanitarian and educational assistance to communities in need. The strong turnout and engagement demonstrated our community’s commitment to working with a united front and strengthening coordinated responses.

Thank you to everyone who joined us. It was truly an honour to share such a meaningful evening—one filled with community, reflection, and solidarity. Your presence made the event incredibly special, and we are deeply grateful for your support. Stay tuned for our April Dardachat event which will be announced in the next few days.

We are pleased to share that photos from the evening are now available. You can view and download your favourite moments through the link below.

As part of this initiative, you are invited to contribute on a pay-what-you-canbasis, with all proceeds supporting NCCAR’s ongoing work.

We would also like to extend a special thank you to our talented photographer, Kassem Harb of Lahza Photography, for beautifully capturing these memorable moments. Mr. Harb has generously offered to donate all proceeds from photo contributions to NCCAR.

We are equally grateful to our dedicated volunteers, whose time and effort were instrumental in making the evening a success.

To continue supporting impactful organizations working tirelessly on the ground, we invite you to visit: https://linktr.ee/theNCCAR

Access the online album.

NCCAR Statement
NCCAR Congratulates New Leadership of the New Democratic Party of Canada

Ottawa — The National Council on Canada-Arab Relations (NCCAR) congratulates Avi Lewis on his election as Leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada. This milestone reflects strong engagement from party members and a growing emphasis on human rights and international humanitarian issues within Canada’s political discourse.

NCCAR also congratulates Libby Davies on her election as Vice President of the NDP, and Niall Ricardo on his election as President. Their leadership signals an opportunity for meaningful dialogue on international law, peace, and justice.

NCCAR remains a non-partisan organization committed to engaging constructively with all political parties. We look forward to working collaboratively to advance humanitarian priorities and address critical human issues affecting the peoples of the Arab world.

We encourage continued dialogue and principled leadership that reflects the values of human dignity, accountability, and respect for international law.

NCCAR offers sincere condolences to Avi Lewis on the passing of his father on March 31, just one day after his election. Our thoughts are with him and his family during this difficult time.

Opinion & Analysis
The Global Economic Risks of the Gulf War between the U.S., Israel, and Iran

Opinion published in the Hamilton Spectator by Dr. Atif Kubursi - McMaster University
March 31, 2026

Wars in the Middle East rarely remain regional events. Their consequences quickly spill beyond borders, disrupting energy markets, financial systems, and geopolitical alliances. The current war directly involving the United States, Israel, and Iran is no exception. What began as three countries at war became a regional conflict as most of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries were dragged into it, then Lebanon joined, Iraq was involved and now Yemen. The war is no longer regional; it is now, by any standard, a global war rapidly triggering global economic and strategic consequences far beyond the Gulf and the Middle East.

The most immediate risk lies in global energy markets. Energy costs feed directly into transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and nearly every other sector of the global economy. The Gulf region remains the center of the world’s oil supply, holding nearly half of the world’s proven reserves and producing a substantial share of global output. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Kuwait together produce more than 30 million barrels of oil per day — roughly one-third of global production.

Even more critical is the Strait of Hormuz. More than a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade and over a fifth of total oil consumption pass through this narrow waterway between Iran and Oman. Oil is not the only critical commodity that passes through, as LNG, Natural Gas, Petrochemicals, Fertilizers, and Helium are also some of the critical products that are transported through this Strait. Yet, it is considered to be one of the most important energy chokepoints on earth. Any sustained disruption to shipping through the strait would remove millions of barrels of oil from the global market almost overnight.

History provides a clear warning about what such disruptions can do. The oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1979 both produced severe global economic shocks. A prolonged closure or disruption of the Strait of Hormuz could produce an even larger shock, given the scale of modern global energy consumption.

In the short run, global oil demand is relatively insensitive to price increases. Economists describe this as “price-inelastic demand.” In practical terms, this means consumers cannot quickly stop driving, airlines cannot easily ground fleets, and industries cannot instantly replace petroleum inputs. When supply falls sharply, prices must therefore rise dramatically before demand adjusts.

Under such circumstances, oil prices could rise well beyond $100 per barrel and could theoretically approach $200 before markets stabilize. Oil prices in 1973 climbed to $147 a barrel in today’s prices. The current oil prices, pushing higher than $120 a barrel, are still below the real price levels in 1973. Whatever oil price level holds now, it is going to be pushed higher as the tensions last. But, even if such levels prove temporary, the economic consequences would be severe. There are already reasons and grounds to believe that a suspension of tensions may not result in a quick price response as the cumulative damages to production capacity in the region escalate, and as ships trapped are hit, and insurance claims remain high and crippling.

Inflation would almost certainly accelerate. Historically, a sustained $10 increase in oil prices has added roughly half a percentage point to inflation in many economies. If oil prices were to rise dramatically, households and businesses would face higher costs across the board. Disposable incomes of consumers and businesses would decline as fuel, energy and consumer goods and bills increase.

Higher energy prices would also weaken economic growth. Businesses would face rising production costs while consumers cut back on spending. As economic activity slows, unemployment would increase. The combination of rising inflation and slowing growth would create the conditions for a form of economic stress similar to the “stagflation” experienced during the 1970s oil crisis.

Financial markets would not remain immune. Geopolitical shocks typically trigger `capital flight` from emerging markets in the Global South as investors everywhere seek safer assets. Equity markets often become volatile, currencies depreciate, and borrowing costs rise. In a highly interconnected global financial system, instability in one region can quickly spread to others.

The current exceptionally chaotic geopolitical environment would make such a shock even more difficult to manage. The global economy is already facing trade tensions, having to deal with Trumpian erratic tariffs, supply-chain disruptions, and slowing growth in several regions. A major energy shock layered on top of these existing stresses could easily increase the probability of a global recession.

Another often overlooked consequence involves remittances. Millions of workers from countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, and various Asian economies are employed in many of the Gulf States and send large portions of their earnings home. At this time, expatriates in the Gulf from South Asia alone number over 21 million, a third of the total population of the GCC countries. Actually, the total expatriates in the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) exceed 35 million, or 56.5% of the total population. In many developing countries, these remittances represent a crucial source of foreign exchange, sometimes exceeding their export earnings and household income. Middle Eastern countries remain a key source of remittances for South Asian nations such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The remittances these five countries receive from the region, $103bn, are comparable to Oman’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Just the remittances that India receives from the Gulf, $50bn, are more than Bahrain’s entire GDP. Pakistan receives $38.3bn in remittances, Bangladesh $13.5bn, Sri Lanka $8bn, and Nepal $5bn.

If conflict disrupts economic activity in the Gulf — particularly, if oil exports are curtailed — migrant workers could lose jobs or see incomes decline. Reduced remittances would create further economic stress in many already fragile and highly indebted economies.

Trade flows could also be affected. Gulf economies import hundreds of billions of dollars in goods each year ($740 billion in 2024). A decline in oil revenues would likely reduce their ability to import goods from the rest of the world, affecting exporters in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and North America.

The environmental and infrastructure consequences of war in the Gulf could also be severe. Several Gulf countries rely heavily on energy-intensive desalination plants for fresh water. Damage to energy facilities or supply disruptions could threaten water security across the region. Industrial fires, damaged infrastructure, and pollution from military activity could also create long-term environmental costs. Already, Tehran has experienced a few days of black rain, Lebanon has reported that Israel is using Phosphorus bombs in South Lebanon and a few unconfirmed reports of the use of depleted Uranium bombs.

There is one possibly positive environmental consequence to this war, and that relates to the possible reduction of consumption of oil and fossil fuels and the potential for heightened incentives to use renewable energy sources. At this time, even this possibility is uncertain as few countries are restarting their coal-fired energy or resorting to nuclear energy.

Beyond these economic effects, the strategic consequences are equally potentially dire. A prolonged war could reshape alliances in the Middle East and alter the balance of power in the region. Countries that have long relied on external security guarantees may begin to reassess and re-evaluate those arrangements if conflict spreads or if security commitments appear uncertain. Already, the US is lashing out its criticisms of NATO.

At the same time, key global political institutions appear increasingly limited in their ability to prevent or resolve major conflicts. Diplomatic mechanisms that once helped contain regional wars are often reeling under relentless criticism from President Trump. This raises troubling questions about how quickly escalation could occur before meaningful international intervention takes place.

None of these outcomes is inevitable. Markets eventually adjust, supply chains adapt, and diplomacy can sometimes halt escalation before the worst scenarios unfold. But the risks are real. The longer a conflict involving the United States, Israel, Iran and now Lebanon persists, the greater the probability that its economic and strategic consequences will spread far beyond the Middle East.

For the global economy, the stakes could hardly be higher.

Dr. Atif Kubursi is President of Econometric Research Limited and Emeritus Professor of Economics at McMaster University. He previously taught at Purdue University, was a Visiting Scholar at Cambridge University, and served as Acting Executive Secretary and Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2006–2008). Dr. Kubursi has consulted with numerous international organizations, including the World Bank, IMF, and several UN agencies. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Purdue University and a B.A. from the American University of Beirut, and served as President of the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations

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